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BLD-113 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 09-3723
___________
MICHAEL EUGENE HODGE,
                                Appellant
v.
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; MARSHAL SERVICE;
THE BUREAU OF PRISONS, and its unknown employees;
JOHN ASHCROFT; USDOJ; DR. J. BRADY; C.L. CONRAD, FNP;
PA INCH; DR. DANIAL E. JESUS; HARLEY G. LAPPIN, USBOP;
HAL MCDONOUGH, USMS; UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT;
DR. THOMAS WEBSTER; MD ERIC WILSON;
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; ALBERTO GONZALES;
KAREN HOGSTEN; WARDEN SCOTT DODRILL;
HARRELL WATTS; A. OKUNDAY; KEVIN PIGOS;
ADMINISTRATOR RONALD LAINO; M.D. CALVIN VERMEIRE
____________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 06-cv-01622)
District Judge:  Honorable James M. Munley
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
 
February 4, 2010
Before: McKEE, RENDELL and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges
(Filed: March 25, 2010)
  Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.1
388 (1971).
  28 U.S.C. §§ 1346 and 2680.2
2
_________
OPINION OF THE COURT
_________
PER CURIAM
Michael Eugene Hodge, a federal prisoner formerly housed at the Federal
Correctional Institution at Allenwood, Pennsylvania (“FCI-Allenwood”), appeals from
the order of the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
dismissing his complaint brought pursuant to Bivens  and the Federal Tort Claims Act1
(“FTCA”),  alleging sub-standard medical treatment of his advanced Hepatitis-C2
condition.  Because we conclude that no substantial question is presented on appeal, we
will summarily affirm.  See LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6.
Within the first six months of his arrival at FCI-Allenwood in December 2004,
Hodge’s hepatitis profile lab test, consultation with a liver specialist (Doctor Sommers),
and liver biopsy all confirmed that he has the Hepatitis-C virus (“HCV”), which was
staged at that time as Grade IV, Stage IV, with cirrhosis of the liver.  The clinic began
administering interferon therapy to Hodge in October 2005.  Hodge was seen routinely
every four to six weeks during his treatment and sometimes more frequently on an as
needed basis.  From December 2005 through September 2006, Hodge’s interferon
  It appears that Hodge requested a special diet at least twice.  In April 2005, he3
was told that “[y]our present diagnosis does not warrant a diet program.”  (See
Defendants’ statement of undisputed facts, Exh. 1, attachment 1, at 249.)  In May 2005,
he was told that “we, by policy, have no special diet for hepatitis.”  (Id. at 68.)  In
November 2005, Hodge requested a nutritional supplement, referred to as a “booster,”
which Defendant Inch denied because Hodge’s weight had remained stable for one year
and, thus, he did not meet the non-formulary requirements.  (Id. at 55.)
3
dosages were either decreased or stopped altogether for periods of time in order to allow
his white blood cell count to increase.  In October 2006, when it appeared that he was not
responding to interferon treatment, the Defendants referred him to a liver specialist, Dr.
Allen Wang, who recommended that Hodge stop the interferon therapy and start an FDA
approved clinical experimental trial of a new anti-viral medication, along with a special
diet consisting of three small meals and three snacks a day.  Pursuant to the advice of the
Regional Medical Consultant, inmate participation in experimental medication trials was
not available through the BOP.  Hodge was also denied a special diet.   Thereafter, the3
Defendants discontinued interferon therapy but continued to monitor Hodge’s HCV
condition until he was transferred to another facility on April 16, 2007.
Hodge filed his original complaint in 2006, followed by two amended complaints,
the last of which was filed in February 2007.  The District Court dismissed sua sponte, for
lack of venue, claims arising out of Hodge’s medical care while he was in pre-trial
detention.  (See D. Ct. Op. (Aug. 31, 2007), at 7-10.)  The District Court dismissed sua
sponte for failure to state a claim, all claims against former United States Attorneys
General Ashcroft and Gonzales, the Director of USMS, the Director, Regional Director,
4and National Administrator of the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”), and the Warden at FCI-
Allenwood, because the Second Amended Complaint (hereafter “Complaint”) lacked any
allegation from which a factfinder could conclude that these Defendants were personally
involved in Hodge’s medical care at FCI-Allenwood.  (Id. at 11-13.)  The District Court
also dismissed Hodge’s Bivens claims against Defendant Inch, holding that the FTCA
was the exclusive remedy for claims against her as a Public Health Service employee. 
(Id. at 10-11.)
That left the Bivens action against Doctors Vermiere, Okunday, Pigos and Brady,
and Administrator Laino, and the FTCA action against the United States.  Hodge alleged
medical malpractice under the FTCA, violations under Bivens of his rights under the
Equal Protection Clause and the Eighth Amendment, and a conspiracy among the
Defendants to violate his constitutional rights.  In addition to damages, he sought a
transfer to another facility and an order compelling the BOP to treat his condition with
“any and all FDA approved medications, use any effective dietary program and comply
with effective AMA standards of care without budgetary restraints.”
The Defendants filed a joint motion to dismiss or, alternatively, for summary
judgment to which Hodge responded.  In separate Reports issued in September 2008, and
January and March 2009, the Magistrate Judge recommended that Hodge’s motions be
denied and that the Defendants’ motion to dismiss or for summary judgment be granted
and the Complaint dismissed.  By orders entered on October 27, 2008, and August 31,
  We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.4
5
2009, the District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge’s September 2008 and January
2009 Reports in full and the March 2009 Report in part, overruled Hodge’s objections,
entered judgment in the Defendants’ favor, and dismissed the case.  Hodge filed this
timely appeal.4
We agree with the District Court’s dismissal of Hodge’s FTCA claim because he
failed to file a certificate of merit (“COM”) required to state a medical negligence claim
under the FTCA.  (See D. Ct. Op. (Aug. 31, 2009), at 12-14.)  In assessing a claim under
the FTCA, we apply the law of the state in which the act or omission occurred.  See
Gould Elecs. Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 179 (3d Cir. 2000).  Hodge had
proffered photocopied pages from a chapter on HCV in a publication authored by Melissa
Palmer, M.D., a national expert on chronic liver disease.  Although he was given an
opportunity to file a compliant COM, Hodge failed to do so.  As the District Court
correctly determined, absent any applicable exceptions to filing a COM under
Pennsylvania law, Hodge’s FTCA claim failed as a matter of law.  (Id. at 13-14.)
Turning to Hodge’s Bivens claims, we conclude that the District Court properly
granted summary judgment for the Defendants.  Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
322-23 (1986).  In order to prevail on his Eighth Amendment claim, Hodge must show
that the Defendant healthcare providers were deliberately indifferent to his serious
medical need.   See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976).  Deliberate indifference
  Hodge’s claims for injunctive relief were also properly dismissed.  (D. Ct. Op.5
(Aug. 31, 2009) at 18-21.)  We express no opinion as to Hodge’s treatment in any federal
prison facility in which he was (or is) housed.
6
requires a sufficiently culpable state of mind, such as “reckless[] disregard[]” to a
substantial risk of serious harm to a prisoner.  See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834,
836 (1994).
We conclude that Hodge has not been deprived of medical care for his HCV at
FCI-Allenwood.  The medical record shows that Hodge was treated with interferon, his
response to which was routinely monitored, and he was seen regularly at the clinic for
complications as they arose.  When the treatment failed, the prison approved his visit to
Doctor Wang, a liver specialist, for consultation.  (Magistrate Judge’s Report (Mar. 6,
2009), at 25-28.)  Although Hodge maintains that the Defendants should have prescribed
“Granulocyte-Colony stimulating factor” medication to treat his low white blood cell
count while he continued on interferon therapy, there is no competent record evidence to
support his claim.  Notably, Doctor Wang did not recommend the medication.  As for the
prison’s decision not to follow Doctor Wang’s clinical drug trial and special diet
recommendations, as the District Court correctly noted, disagreements between Hodge
and his physicians, or among physicians, concerning the course of medical treatment for
advanced HCV with cirrhosis do not support a claim for a violation of the Eighth
Amendment.  Monmouth County Corr. Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326,
346 (3d Cir. 1987).5
  We agree with the District Court’s conclusion and reasoning in dismissing6
Hodge’s monetary claims against the individual Defendants in their official capacities. 
(D. Ct. Op. at 17-18.)  The District Court also properly dismissed the claims against
Defendants Ashcroft, Gonzales, McDonough, Lappin, Hogsten, Dodrill and Watts
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), and claims against Defendant Laino at summary
judgment, because neither the allegations (as to the seven Defendants), taken as true, nor
the undisputed facts (as to Laino), viewed in the light most favorable to Hodge, would
lead to a reasonable inference that these Defendants were personally involved in Hodge’s
care.  See Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988).  (D. Ct. Op. at 21-2
7
The District Court also properly entered judgment in favor of the Defendants on
Hodge’s claim of a conspiracy under Bivens.  Hodge based his civil conspiracy claim
upon the conclusory allegation, unsupported by any evidence, that two or more of the
Defendants “reached an agreement to deprive him or her of a constitutional right under
color of law.”  Parkway Garage, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 5 F.3d 685, 700 (3d Cir.
1993).  Without more, Hodge’s bare allegation of an agreement is insufficient for a
reasonable juror to conclude that the Defendants engaged in a conspiracy to violate his
constitutional rights.  See Abbott v. Latshaw, 164 F.3d 141, 148 (3d Cir. 1998).
As for his equal protection claim, we conclude that Hodge failed to identify any
similarly situated inmate whose advanced stage HCV was treated differently by the BOP. 
See Chambers ex rel. Chambers v. Sch. Dist. of Phila. Bd. of Educ., 587 F.3d 176, 196
(3d Cir. 2009) (stating that, to bring a successful equal protection claim, plaintiffs must
prove, among other things, that “they received different treatment from that received by
other individuals similarly situated”).  Therefore, the District Court properly granted
summary judgment on this claim.6
8The District Court properly denied Hodge’s motion to amend his complaint as
futile because the proposed amendment (adding the federal marshal who allegedly
delayed service of the Complaint) did not go to the merits of Hodge’s claims under
Bivens or the FTCA.  (See D. Ct. Order (Oct. 27, 2008).)  The District Court also
properly denied Hodge’s motion for a government funded medical expert because the
court lacked authority to grant the request.  See Boring v. Kozakiewicz, 833 F.2d 468,
474 (3d Cir. 1987) (finding no authority for court to pay for indigent plaintiff’s expert
witnesses); (D. Ct. Op. at 8-12.)  We discern no abuse of discretion in the denial of
Hodge’s motion to compel.  (Id. at 15-16.)  Doctor Sommers did not work at FCI-
Allenwood and he was not named as a party to the action.  Moreover, the Defendants
disclosed most of the requested background information or the source for obtaining the
information requested.  (Report and Recommendation (Mar. 6, 2009), at 8-9.)  As the
District Court correctly noted, Hodge failed to explain how the Defendants’ educational
backgrounds and prior work histories were relevant to his claims.  We find no error in the
District Court’s decision to deny Hodge’s motion to compel.
Accordingly, we will affirm the order of the District Court.
